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NYT 4th Down Bot
Collection Methods
• Pro-Football-Reference Play Index and nflscrapR PBP Data
• 4th downs with scoring margin between 21 points
• No blowouts to skew data
• Every play given a specific, unique PlayID
• Cross-reference in Excel with nflscrapR Win Probability data
Data
• Of the 31,206 4th downs in question, 29,713 “counted”
• No penalty or extenuating circumstance to cancel out play
• Coaches followed NYT advice 76.4% of the time in total
• Punt: Follows advice 94.8%
• Field Goal: Follows advice 89.4%
• When told to go for it: follows advice 29.5%
Outliers
• Extremely low/high win probabilities and late in half
• Plays with a pre-play win probability of above 80% or below 
20%, as well as all plays after the two-minute warning in 
either half are situation-dependent
• Coaches followed NYT advice 78.8% of the time in total
• Punt: follows advice 99.0%
• Field Goal: follows advice 95.6%
• When told to go for it: follows advice 24.4%
• Coaches are less inclined to go for it unless they are 
seemingly forced to by game conditions
Win Probabilities
• In “close game scenarios”, win probability increases by roughly 3% per play
• Punting increases win probability by ~4%
• Kicking a field goal increases win probability by ~0.8%
• Going for it increases win probability by ~2.9%
• In “close game scenarios” win probability increases by roughly 1.9% per play
• Punting (when advised to do differently) increases win probability by ~2.2%
• Kicking a field goal increases win probability by ~1%
• Going for it increases win probability by ~2.8%
Comparison
• When advised to punt, punting is the best decision
• Kicking a field goal is a low-reward situation compared to punting or going for it
• Going for it, whether advised or not, has higher average win probability added 
than kicking a field goal at any time or punting when advised against it
Conclusion
• NYT Model was great for 2014 but is outdated
• 4th and 1s everywhere may be extreme, but aggressiveness in the middle of the 
field is a place to start
• Data is always evolving and models must follow newer data
NYT Model
• Built in 2014, uses neutral game-script situations
• Static model built for league 5 years ago
• Needs updates with current league conditions and increased variables
• Score of game and time remaining in game
• Team/opponent strength
• On-field personnel
• Weather conditions
• Location of game
Questions
1. Does knowing how scripted the 
NFL is when it comes down to 4th 
down, frustrate you as some who 
wants to work in the industry?
2. What will make the NFL 
embrace this aggressive style of 
going for it on 4th down more 
often?
